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I. Introduction
The success of the American economy over time has been linked to its entrepreneurial spirit. Individual initiative and creativity, along with small business and wealth creation, are indelible parts of the American spirit. The recent technological revolution and resulting economic restructuring have made both the general public and government officials keenly aware of the entrepreneur's role in job and wealth creation (Hebert and Link, 1989) . This critical role in economic development has fostered efforts by all levels of government to promote entrepreneurship (Hart, 2001 ).
However, another crucial component of American economic, political and social stability is increasingly recognized: Philanthropy. Merle Curti in 1957 advanced the hypothesis that "philanthropy has been one of the major aspects of and keys to American social and cultural development" (Curti, 1957: 353) . To this we would add that philanthropy has also been crucial in economic development. Further, when combined with entrepreneurship, the entrepreneurship-philanthropy nexus (Acs and Phillips, 2002) becomes a potent force in explaining the long-run dominance of the American economy.
A major difference between American capitalism and many other forms of capitalism 1 (Japanese, French, German and Scandinavian) is a historic focus on both the creation of wealth (entrepreneurship) and the reconstitution of wealth (philanthropy).
Philanthropy is imbedded within an implicit social contract that stipulates wealth beyond a certain point should revert to society (Chernow, 1999) . Although individuals are free to accumulate wealth, it must be invested back into society to expand opportunity (Acs and 1 For a statement on the nature and logic of capitalism see Robert L. Heilbroner (1985) . Of course it is precisely the institutional framework that differs from country to country and not necessarily the logic of the system. For a discussion of the different institutional frameworks see Michael Porter (2000) on Japan, Dana, 2001) . In this paper, we cast the United States as the unique product of a certain type of human character and social role, one which produced the English Revolution and modern American civilization. In this character type, the agent possessed unprecedented new powers of discretion and self-reliance, yet was bound to collective ends by novel emerging forms of institutional authority and internal restraint (Dewey, 1998) 2 . Much of the new wealth in the U.S. has historically been given back to the community to build up the great social institutions that, in turn, pave the way for future economic growth 3 .
Though it is recognized that the philanthropists of the nineteenth century enabled the foundation for wealth creation and social stability, this has not been quantified within the framework of private and social costs and benefits (America, 1995) . Take, for example, the challenge of calculating the ex post benefits of the establishment of the University of Chicago by the Rockefeller family. Certainly, there was no immediate private benefit to the donor family and contributions occurred several generations later.
The number of Nobel Prize winners at the university is perhaps just one measure of social benefits that emerge from the original investment. The complexity of measuring (and even identifying) ex post benefits demonstrates that the entrepreneurship-philanthropy nexus has not been fully understood -neither by either economists nor the general public. This is, in part, due to an intellectually restrictive view of self-interest as a (perhaps the) fundamental driver of capitalism. (Soros, 1988) . We suggest that by analyzing philanthropy, we are better able to understand both the process of economic development and an underlying reason for American economic dominance.
In the next section we examine the economics of philanthropy and altruism as individual behavior. In the third section, we provide a brief background on the origins of philanthropy in American history, and discuss some of its early contribution to economic prosperity. The fourth section outlines strengths of American capitalism -namely entrepreneurship, innovation, and wealth creation. The fifth section examines philanthropy in the new "Gilded Age" and asks how well the institutions of the philanthropic sector are meeting the goals of creating economic opportunity. We provide conclusions and implications for policymakers, foundations and the intellectual community in the final section.
II. The Economics of Philanthropy and Altruism
The word philanthropy literally means "love of mankind" and philanthropic acts depend upon the generosity of the giver. Although we do not seek to define philanthropy or evaluate competing definitions, we would like to describe the concept. In this paper, we take philanthropy as: Giving money or its equivalent to persons and institutions outside the family without a definite or immediate quid pro quo for purposes traditionally considered philanthropic. Soloman Fabricant discussed the relationship of philanthropy to economic development (Dickinson, 1970: 8) :
"…in this broad sense philanthropy is a necessary condition of social existence, and the extent to which it is developed influences an economy's productiveness. For decent conduct pays large returns to society as a whole, partly in the form of a higher level of national income than would otherwise be possible. Underdeveloped countries are learning that, despite their hurry to reach desired levels of economic efficiency, time must be taken to develop the kind of business ethics, respect for the law, and treatment of strangers that keep a modern industrial society productive.
Widening of the concepts of family loyalty and tribal brotherhood to include love a man "in general" is a necessary step in the process of economic development."
Economists from Adam Smith (1937 Smith ( (1776 ) onwards have recognized the role of self-interest in the creation of wealth, through the assumption that self-interest is the underlying motivation behind human exchange. Critics of capitalism, notably Karl Marx, focused on negative effects, especially its resulting maldistribution of wealth. Indeed, although wealthy entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century certainly provided the impetus for Thorstein Veblen's (1899) "leisure class," they were, at the same time, also great philanthropists (Sugden, 1982) .
When economists confront philanthropic behavior, they seek the quid pro quo behind the act. They conclude that although behavior appears to be altruistic, it is fundamentally consistent with self-interest. Contemporary economic theory has largely ignored the possibility of purely altruistic behavior (though with notable exceptions -see Margolis, 1982; Sugden, 1982) How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles of his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.
The behavior described by above appears consistent with modern economics, specifically the premise that "utility" is derived from the choices on which one's income may be spent. Starting from this, economists have generated interdependent utility functions, so that the utility ("happiness" or "satisfaction") one person receives is dependent upon that of another (Ireland, 1969; Kaufman, 1993; Sugden, 1982; Danielsen, 1975) .
However, Kenneth Boulding suggests that although "it is tempting for the economist to argue that there are really no gifts and that all transactions involve some kind of exchange, that is, some kind of quid pro quo (Boulding, 1962: 57-58) ," such an 4 In contrast to this, a survey of theory and research on altruism by sociologists concluded that evidence points to the existence of altruism as a part of human nature (Pilavin and Charng, 1990) . 5 Also see Coase (1976) . 6 "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Smith, 1937 (Smith, (1776 . 7 approach seriously misleads us because there is nothing in utility theory that requires all motivations to be alike. Indeed, in Boulding's view, the motivation leading to philanthropic behavior--where there is no quid pro quo --"may be very different from that which leads us to build up a personal estate or to purchase consumption goods for our own use" (Boulding, 1962: 61 (Boulding, 1962: 65) .
Further, the neo-classical assumption of utility maximization neglects to specify what utility actually is, making it impossible to separate altruism from selfishness (Simon, 1983: 158) . Simon defines altruism as "sacrifice of fitness" It is then possible (in principle) to determine which choices are selfish or altruistic by examining the effect of a million dollar gift, for example, on the number of progeny of the donor (Simon, 1993: 158). Simon concludes that economic theory has treated economic gain as the primary human motive, but an empirically grounded theory would assign comparable weight to other motives, including altruism and the organizational identification associated with it (Simon, 1993: 160) .
Is philanthropic behavior always self-interest motivated, i.e., is there always a quid pro quo? Or is there also behavior, as Boulding argues, where there is no quid pro quo? We argue that the vitality of American capitalism is testament to the importance of non-self-interest motivated behavior, and also that altruism is superior to enlightened self-interest. Hence, an economic theory that adequately explains the real world must explicitly introduce altruistic behavior into its models of individual behavior (Simon, 1993; Budd, 1956; Giddings, 1893) . We consider U.S. history an example of the superiority of altruism over enlightened self-interest, and this has been crucial to economic prosperity over time.
III. The Contributions of the Nineteenth Century Philanthropists
Studying philanthropy in the context of economic prosperity is not a new idea. In agreed that all men must somehow be sustained at the level of subsistence" (Jordan, 1961:401) . Though charitable organizations at the beginning of this period were centered around religion, religious charities comprised only 7 per cent of all charities by the end of the sixteenth century (Jordan, 1961: 402) .
How is this philanthropic behavior explained? According to Jordan, there existed a partly religious and partly secular sensitivity to human suffering in sixteenth-century
England. (Jordan, 1961: 406) . Another important motivating factor was Calvinism, which taught that "the rich man is a trustee for wealth which he disposes for benefit of mankind, as a steward who lies under direct obligation to do Christ's will" (Jordan, 1961: 406-7) .
The real founders of American philanthropy, then, were the English men and women who crossed the Atlantic to establish communities better than the ones at home 7 (Owen, 1964) . Beginning with the Puritans, who regarded excessive profit-making as both a crime and a sin 8 , there is a long tradition of Americans questioning the right of people to become rich. Puritan principles of industry, frugality and humility had an enduring impact on America (Tocqueville 1966 (Tocqueville (1935 ). In view of the popular prejudice against ostentatious enjoyment of riches, the luxury of doing good was almost the only extravagance the American rich of the first half of the nineteenth century could indulge in with good consciences (Tocqueville, 1966 (Tocqueville, (1835 Veblen, 1899) . To whatever extent this was true, things had certainly changed by the second half of the century when Carnegie, Mellon, Duke and others were making their fortunes.
Andrew Carnegie was the ideal Calvinist. Philanthropy was at the heart of his "gospel of wealth" (Hamer, 1998) . For Carnegie, the question was not only, "How to gain wealth?" but, equally importantly, "What to do with it?" The Gospel of Wealth suggested that millionaires administer their wealth as a public trust during their lives, as opposed to bequeathing to heirs or making benevolent grants by will (Carnegie, 1889) .
Both Carnegie (at the time) and Jordan (as a historian) suggest that a key motive for philanthropy is social order and harmony 9 .
7 The Puritan leader John Winthrop forthrightly stated their purpose in the lay sermon, "A Model of Christian Charity," in which he preached on the ship "Arabella" to the great company of religious people voyaging from the old world to New England in the year 1630 (Bremner, 1960:7) . 8 and punished it accordingly. 9 It is plausible that philanthropists like Carnegie took a longer term approach and realized that their interests necessitated assisting the worthy poor and disadvantaged: enlightened self interest as opposed to altruism.
In the past, the malefactors of great wealth were also benefactors of extraordinary generosity (Myers, 1907 One of the greatest nineteenth-century philanthropists was George Peabody, who developed a philosophy of philanthropy that seemed to have two important considerations. One was a deep devotion to the communities in which he was reared or in which he made money. The other was a secular vision of the Puritan doctrine of the stewardship of riches: His desire, in the simplest terms, was to be useful to mankind. In his lifetime, he donated more than $8 million to libraries, science, housing, education, exploration, historical societies, hospitals, churches and other charities (Parker, 1971: 209). Peabody's most enduring influence, however, lies in the precedents and policies formulated by the Peabody Education Fund Trustees. This fund paved the way for future foundation aid to the South after the Civil War. Perhaps more important, it also influenced operational patterns of subsequent major foundations, including John D.
Rockefeller's Education Board, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation. In this way, George Peabody is considered the founder of modern educational foundations (Christian Science Monitor, as cited in Parker, 1971: 208) .
George Peabody was in fact the originator of that system of endowed foundations for public purposes…. It is interesting to consider the many ways in which the example set by [George Peabody] has been followed by visioned men of means in the United States…In a sense the Peabody Fund was not the only monument to George Peabody, for the example he set has been followed by a host of other Americans.
In 1867, Peabody explained his philanthropy to Johns Hopkins, a Baltimore merchant and financier: "To place the millions I had accumulated, so as to accomplish the greatest good for humanity." Hopkins donated his entire fortune of $8 million (an extraordinary amount of money at the time) to found the Johns Hopkins University, Medical School and Hospital (Brody, 1998) . Each institution, which would have separate but closely linked boards of trustees, was given $3.5 million to establish itself. It was at the time the largest philanthropic bequest in U.S. history. Thus Peabody, apart from his own charities, may honorably stand in the shadow of what Hopkins achieved (Offit, 1995) .
The nineteenth century American model of entrepreneurship and philanthropy was followed by a period of progressivism 10 in the early twentieth-century and then by World War I. Though the 1920s was a period of technological change and prosperity, underlying economic problems resulted in the collapse of the world economy into the Great Depression of the 1930s. This period, along with World War II, changed the role of government and the philanthropic activities of the entrepreneur. It is not our point here to argue that the role of philanthropy was to provide social welfare-health insurance, social security, unemployment insurance. Indeed, the rise of the state in the twentieth century was in some ways a rise of social welfare provided by government.
This function, however, is distinct from the pure function of philanthropy that arises from issues of wealth accumulation. 12 . However, as we will see in the next section, the elimination of opportunities for wealth creation has social consequences that go far beyond philanthropy.
IV. The Strengths of American Capitalism
11 See Salamon and Ahheier (1999) . 12 "There's no escaping the brutal truth: the nation famous for capitalism red in tooth and claw, the epicenter of the heartless marketplace, is also the land of the handout. It's not really such a paradox. Both our entrepreneurial economic system and out philanthropic tradition spring for the same root: American individualism. Other countries may be content to let the government run most of their schools and universities, pay for their hospitals, subsidize their museums and orchestras, even in some cases support religious sects. Americans tend to think most of these institutions are best kept in private hands, and they have been willing to cough up the money to pay for them." (Newsweek, September 29, 1997: 34) Joseph A. Schumpeter proposed his concept of the entrepreneur against the backdrop of economic development in The Theory of Economic Development (1934 Development ( (1911 ). The function of the entrepreneur is to reform or revolutionize the patterns of production by exploiting an invention or more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old line in a new way.
Six decades after this initial contribution, it is the large corporation that draws attention to Schumpeter's gloomy prospects for economic progress in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1950 (1942) Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automatize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous -to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success. The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit not only ousts the small or medium-sized firms and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class which in the process stands to lose not only its income but also what is infinitely more important, its function.
As the large firm replaces the small and medium sized enterprise, economic concentration starts to have a negative feedback effect on entrepreneurial values, innovation and technological change. Technology -the means by which new markets are created -may die out, leading to a stationary state. This view of the future capitalist society was held by Keynes (1963) , Schumpeter (1942 Schumpeter ( (1950 ) and much of the 1960s intellectual left (Heilbroner, 1985) 13 .
Schumpeter was nearly right in Sweden (Henreksen and Jakobsson, 2000) , and his prognoses about economic consequences of firm-size appear true for former socialist countries, where industrial concentration has left its mark (Stiglitz, 1994 (Garten, 1992) 15 . However, after a quarter century of ups and downs since 1976, the U.S. economy appears to be doing extraordinarily well 16 . Unemployment in 1999 was just under five percent, the economy was growing at four percent a year, inflation was at bay, manufacturing productivity was rising, the dollar was strong and the stock market was consistently breaking records. It appears that the U. S. economy has restructured itself, moving from an industrial base to a knowledge base, and transitioned to the next century. 13 For an alternative view see Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, (New York: A Meridian Book, 1999). 14 Jeffrey E. Garten, Under Secretary of Commerce, summed up this view at the beginning of the first Clinton administration (1922: 15): "Relative to Japan and Germany, our economic prospects are poor and our political influence is waning. Their economic underpinnings -trends in investment, productivity, market share in high technology, education and training -are stronger. Their banks and industry are in better shape; their social problems are far less severe than ours. 15 Also see Tyson (1992) and Thurow (1992 18 Between 1998 and 2001, four trillion dollars of new wealth was created in the stock market. The number of billionaires had increased from 13 in 1982 to 170 today; the number of deca-millionaires stands at 250,000 and millionaires at 4.8 million (Economist, May 30, 1998: 19) . The impressive performance of the U. S. in the last few years may be contrasted with the rather lackluster performance in both Europe and Japan, where GDP has grown at less than 1.5% per annum in the last five years. In the European Union (EU) the unemployment rate has remained stubbornly in double digits, and in Japan the stock market has allow individuals in an entrepreneurial society. If it is taxed away, wealth creation will cease. However, with that right is responsibility. Private wealth that was created in a community needs to be reinvested in the future growth of society, and this is as true now as it was for early American philanthropists. In fact, as enormous new wealth has been created, the role of philanthropy has similarly grown. The contribution to philanthropy in the U.S. rose to around two per cent of GDP. The number of active private and community foundations has more than doubled since 1980. About three-fifths of the largest foundations have been created since 1980.
It has only been in the last two decades, since 1982, that a combination of political changes (Reagan Revolution), massive technological advances and the collapse of communism have enabled a return to American roots of individualism, entrepreneurship and philanthropy. However, while entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for the shift from industrial capitalism to an entrepreneurial society, it is not by itself sufficient for economic prosperity, opportunity and social progress.
been stagnant since the early 1992 at half its previous level (Audretsch and Thurik, 1998; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Acs, Carlsson and Karlsson, 1999; Acs and Armington, 2001; Carree et al, 2001 ).
V. Philanthropy in the "New Gilded Age"
At the beginning of this chapter, we suggested that American philanthropists created foundations that, in turn, enabled greater and more widespread economic prosperity (by investing in the future of America). However, such views are not fashionable among scholars of philanthropy and more than a few professionals that staff foundations. For example, a book published by MIT Press on American foundations argues that they serve largely as vehicles for advancing the interests of their benefactors (Dowie, 2001) . At an American Assembly meeting a few years ago, the participants (most were professionals from foundations and non-profit groups) produced a statement calling on philanthropists to do more to redistribute their wealth from the "haves" to the "have nots." Carnegie would have been appalled since he thought that by fostering greater economic opportunities, philanthropists could prevent such redistributive schemes.
It is important to reiterate the argument. We need to distinguish redistribution of wealth from the creation of opportunity, both intellectually in academy and operationally in foundations. This distinction is similar to that between small business and entrepreneurship: Small business is about lifestyle and entrepreneurship is about wealth creation. In the same sense, charity is about redistribution while philanthropy in the American tradition is about investing wealth to create opportunity. The first question is:
How do we evaluate what should be done and what has gone before? What is needed is a benchmark against which to evaluate the role of philanthropy today. This clearly does not exist. However, Jeffrey Sachs articulated a position by which to judge our philanthropic activities based on past accomplishments:
Creating opportunity for future generations means creating knowledge today 19 , and the model to study is the Rockefeller Foundation 20 (The Economist, June 24, 2000) . Schramm suggests that ideas and personnel 19 For a theory of knowledge in economic growth, see Arrow (1962) and Romer (1990) . For an application to the regional and global economy see Acs (2000) . 20 Sachs writes: "The model to emulate is the Rockefeller Foundation, the pre-eminent development institution of the 20 th century, which showed what grant aid targeted on knowledge could accomplish. Rockefeller funds supported the eradication of hookworm in the American South; the discovery of the Yellow Fever vaccine; the development of penicillin; the (i.e. internal human capital) enable foundations to work through intellectual influence (Schramm, forthcoming) . While it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify all wealthy entrepreneurs and to study their relative philanthropic engagement, we will briefly address four that set the standard: George Soros, Ted Turner, Bill Gates and Warren 
VI. Conclusion
From an American perspective, the current model of entrepreneurial capitalism, with its sharp focus on entrepreneurship and philanthropy, offers continued potential to create and strengthen important institutions that seek to equalize unequal distribution of wealth. There are important implications for a range of stakeholders in the economy, and we will outline those specific to policymakers, foundation professionals and the intellectual community. 
Public Policy Implications
Policy issues arise at many levels -federal, state, local -and across a range of decision-making bodies and policy arenas -taxation, small business support, education, Government policies should be designed to support, or at least not hinder, the flow of money into the philanthropic sector. Legal and regulatory policy affects both the demand and supply conditions in this sector. For example, rather then constraining the rich through taxes, they may be more effective at creating social change by creating opportunity 25 . Foundations operate under complex regulatory frameworks, facing tighter restrictions than public charities -such as excise taxes on net investment income -and have gone through periods of restricted independence and operational scrutiny (Schramm, 25 In the past, the fight against slavery had some very wealthy backers. If we shut off the opportunities for wealthy individuals to give back their wealth we will also shut off the creation of wealth which has far greater consequences for an entrepreneurial society. It is the channeling of this wealth to socially useful and constructive activities that may offer the greatest possibility for social change.
forthcoming). The idea of donor intent 26 is threatened by a move to blanket foundations within the realm of "public, quasi-governmental institutions," where the notion of public purpose is mistaken for public money (Schramm, forthcoming) .
The very strength of the American foundation is its conceptualization as an outmarket institution (Schramm, forthcoming) . Driven by a renewed spirit of philanthropy among the new rich, the foundation has the potential to strengthen future American economic prosperity. In addition to domestic implications, the entrepreneurshipphilanthropy nexus has significant global application. Sustaining global capitalism will require vision and investment from and a spread of the ideas that indeed make American capitalism successful. The projects for philanthropy are as broad today as they were one 26 And therefore, potentially the ultimate mission for which the foundation was established.
In industrial capitalist wealth creation, wealth ownership and wealth distribution were, in part, left to the state. However, in an entrepreneurial society, individual initiative plays a vital role in propelling the system forward. Entrepreneurial leadership is the mechanism by which new combinations are created, new markets are opened and new technologies are commercialized. In the entrepreneurial society, entrepreneurship plays a vital role in wealth creation and philanthropy plays a crucial role in its distribution. The execution of this, as we argued earlier, was based on a new character type with unprecedented new powers of discretion but yet bound to collective ends. From a global perspective, the American model of entrepreneurial capitalism offers a sustainable and self-reinforcing means through which to encourage prosperity and advancement.
Implications for Foundations
From the perspective of those working in philanthropy, particularly those in grantmaking and mission-based foundations, the pressing question may well be: How well is the philanthropic sector meeting its obligations? Is the sector, in fact, challenging the new rich to use their wealth to "find permanent solutions to what seem like intractable problems?" (The Wall Street Journal, Milken, 1999) .
As with most organizations, operational efficiency is a concern 27 and it may now be time for market mechanisms to be applied to the philanthropic sector 28 . Organizational capacity may be improved by expanding beyond merely program innovation (Letts, et. al, 1997 ). The challenge is not just to create solutions (Morino Institute, 2000; W. K.
27 John Doerr, who leads the $20 million dollar New Schools Ventures Fund, argues that one of the major problems with the nonprofit sector is that there is not a mechanism to weed out inefficient organizations (Time, 2000: 55) .
Kellogg Foundation; Reis, 1999) but to make them affordable, sustainable, replicable and scaleable to fulfill organizational mission. Lessons from the for-profit world 29 , such as performance-based compensation, entry and exit strategies, and financial sustainability may be useful for foundations.
Research agendas
In addition to the immediate public policy implications and the considerations for 28 This is consistent with the emergence of focus on "hybrid" management in business schools, social enterprising for nonprofits, and the "double bottom line." 29 The founders of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, have established a for profit charitable foundation. This is a new mdoel and one that will allow the foundation to fund start-up companies, form partnerships with venture capitalists and even to lobby Congress. Unlike other foundations, the Google Foundation is not being established for tax reasons (Hafner 2006 ).
